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An International Organization’s Identity Crisis
By Sungjoon Cho*
Abstract: The ontological status of international organizations remains largely
nebulous despite their contemporary prominence. Traditional international relations
theories regard international organizations (IOs) as instruments primarily created to
serve powerful states’ interests (neorealism) or to facilitate interstate cooperation on
certain regulatory areas (neoliberal institutionalism). These theories hardly offer a
satisfactory explanation of a distinctive mode of IOs’ identity forming process, in
which a particular IO, as a separate and autonomous organic entity, grows, evolves
and eventually makes sense of its own existence. This Article offers a novel
perspective that attempts to overcome the aforementioned theoretical deficiency.
Drawing on the identity theory in psychology, this new perspective captures an IO’s
internal normative development in which one can witness a dynamic process of
identity formation. The Article argues that based on its autonomy sine qua non
organization, and not merely as an instrument of states, an IO forms its unique legal
identity as it experiences a normative crisis in a similar way that a human individual
would. An IO discovers its genuine identity only after it achieves a necessary level of
institutional maturity as a result of incessant legal interactions and communications
with its environment. The Article tests this new framework by applying it to the World
Trade Organization.
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I. INTRODUCTION: A PARADIGM SHIFT IN AN
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION
International organizations (IOs) are ubiquitous. More than two
hundred IOs1 touch our everyday lives. Their missions vary. The United
Nations (UN) plays a significant role in securing global peace and order as
1

See, e.g., UNION OF INT’L ASS’NS, YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, App. 3:
Table 1 (2005/2006), available at http://www.uia.org/statistics/organizations/types-2004.pdf. When I
use “international organizations” in this article, I mean “intergovernmental organizations.”
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it addresses international conflicts and fights terrorism.2 The World Bank
is the world’s largest external funder of education.3 Other IOs also impact
numerous diurnal issues, such as air travel (International Civil Aviation
Organization), 4 banking (Bank for International Settlements), 5 mail
(Universal Postal Union), 6 flu shots (World Health Organization), 7 and
mobile phones (International Telecommunication Union),8 to name a few.9
IOs now pertain to nearly every aspect of practical human enterprise.10
Notwithstanding their contemporary prominence, IOs’ real nature
remains contentious. What is an IO? Is it simply an instrument of
powerful states? If so, would it be worthwhile to study an IO on its own
terms? How on do we perceive and investigate an IO?
Conventional international relations (IR) theories, such as
neorealism 11 or neoliberal institutionalism, 12 often collectively labeled
“rationalism,” 13 consider IOs passive machines. 14 According to these
2

See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1822, U.N. Doc S/RES/1822 (June 20, 2008), available at http://www.un.org/
en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1822 (resolving to freeze financial assets used for terrorist
activities).
3
Ten Things That You Never Knew About the World Bank, WORLD BANK, http://digitalmedia.
worldbank.org/tenthings/ (last visited Aug. 26, 2014).
4
INT’L CIVIL AVIATION ORG., http://www.icao.int/ (last visited Aug. 26, 2014).
5
BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, http://www.bis.org/ (last visited Aug. 26, 2014); see also Global
Partnership for Education and the World Bank, WORLD BANK, http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/
EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTEDUCATION/0,,contentMDK:20278663~menuPK:617564~pagePK:14895
6~piPK:216618~theSitePK:282386,00.html (last visited Aug. 26, 2014).
6
UNIVERSAL POSTAL UNION, http://www.upu.int/ (last visited Aug. 26, 2014).
7
WORLD HEALTH ORG., http://www.who.int/en/ (last visited Aug. 26, 2014).
8
INT’L TELECOMMUNICATION UNION, http://www.itu.int/en/pages/default.aspx (last visited Aug. 26, 2014).
9
See generally AM. SOC’Y OF INT’L LAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW: 100 WAYS IT SHAPES OUR LIVES
(2006), available at http://www.asil.org/sites/default/files/100%20Ways%20Booklet_2011.pdf.
10
See FREDERIC L. KIRGIS, JR., INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THEIR LEGAL SETTING (2d ed. 1993).
11
My use of “realism” in this Article means “structural realism” or “neorealism,” which employs a
Hobbesian view of an anarchic state system and a submissive role of international law which structural
realists or neorealists contend is a mere “epiphenomenon of underlying power” or a “coincidence of
state interests or coercion by powerful states.” See Richard H. Steinberg & Jonathan M. Zasloff, Power
and International Law, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 64, 73–76 (2006); KENNETH N. WALTZ, THEORY OF
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 105 (2010); Stephen D. Krasner, Structural Causes and Regime
Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables, in INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 185 (Stephen D.
Krasner ed., 1983); JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 36–
37, 118, 225 (2005). It might be fair to say that most contemporary realists, both legal scholars and
political scientists, are “structural realists” or “neorealists” in essence because, despite their nuanced
acknowledgement of institutional influence of international law and international organizations, they
still refuse to endorse a genuine “endogenous” impact of international law to state behaviors. See
Robert Knowles, American Hegemony and the Foreign Affairs Constitution, 41 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 87, 112
(2009) (equating “structural realism” to “neorealism” as a “recent incarnation” of the classical realism).
12
In this Article, I use “neoliberalism” and “neoliberal institutionalism” interchangeably.
13
According to Robert Keohane, the common thesis of rationalism is substantive rationality
represented by such factors as power, interest, and efficiency. Robert O. Keohane, International
Institutions: Two Approaches, 32 INT’L STUD. Q. 379, 386–87 (1988).
14
See Bertjan Verbeek, International Organizations: The Ugly Duckling of International Relations
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theories, IOs are built to serve powerful states’ interests (neorealism) or
meet certain functional needs among like-minded states (neoliberal
institutionalism). Under this rationalist position, while an IO may help
preserve the extant power equilibrium (neorealism) or reduce transaction
costs (neoliberal institutionalism), it seldom has a life of its own. 15
Unsurprisingly, conventional IR theories tend to limit their analytical focus
to IOs’ creation and the interstate dynamics that lead up to their creation.
Thus, IOs’ institutional development is an underexplored issue in a
rationalist world.16 To rationalists, an IO is a “great yawn.”17
Nonetheless, rationalism could not capture a complete picture of an
IO, particularly an IO’s operation. If seen as a mere tool for states, one
might not be able to explain how an IO evolves on its own terms as an
autonomous entity as it incessantly interacts with its surroundings.18 An IO
also emerges on its own terms,19 rather than being simply created by states.
Considering an IO’s various autonomous roles, such as an arbiter and a
manager of enforcement,20 this theoretical deficit is problematic: it fails to
render an adequate explanation on the IO’s institutional life cycle.
This Article proposes a novel perspective to plug the theoretical gap
Theory?, in AUTONOMOUS POLICY MAKING BY INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 11 (Bob Reinalda &
Bertjan Verbeek eds., 1998) (critically observing that IR scholars treat IOs as a “residual” subject which
is “only marginally important” to the explanation of international affairs). Regarding some notable
exceptions, see JAMES G. MARCH, DECISIONS AND ORGANIZATIONS (1991) (addressing an internal
organizational culture and its decision-making process); Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Why
States Act through Formal International Organizations, 42 J. CONFLICT RES. 3 (1998) (focusing on
“centralization” and “independence” of a formal international organization). Abbott and Snidal observed
that “states have taken IOs more seriously than have scholars.” Id. at 29.
15
See Gayl D. Ness & Steven R. Brechin, Bridging the Gap: International Organizations as
Organizations, 42 INT’L ORG. 245, 246 (1988); see also Harold K. Jacobson et al., National
Entanglements and International Government Organizations, 80 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 141 (1986).
16
See Laurence R. Helfer, Understanding Change in International Organizations: Globalization
and Innovation in the ILO, 59 VAND. L. REV. 649, 655 (2006); see also Michael Tierney & Catherine
Weaver, Principles and Principals? The Possibilities for Theoretical Synthesis and Scientific Progress in
the Study of International Organizations (Mar. 2005) (unpublished conference paper for the
International Studies Association meeting in Honolulu, Hawaii) (on file with author) (observing that
statist theories, such as realism, cannot fully capture IOs as “actors in their own right, making decisions
and exercising power and influence within their normative and material environments”); see also
ALEXANDER WENDT, SOCIAL THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 315 (1999) (observing that realism
would “not preclude changes of identity and interest, as long as this occurs in the first ‘step,’ before or
outside the interaction being analyzed”) (emphasis added).
17
MICHAEL BARNETT & MARTHA FINNEMORE, RULES FOR THE WORLD: INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATION IN GLOBAL POLITICS vii–viii (2004) (quoting Susan Strange, Why Do IOs Never Die?,
in AUTONOMOUS POLICY MAKING BY INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 213–20 (B. Reinalda & B.
Verbeek eds., 1998)).
18
Michael Barnett & Liv Coleman, Designing Police: Interpol and the Study of Change in
International Organizations, 49 INT’L STUD. Q. 593, 593 (2005) (critically observing that IR scholars
have seldom focused on the “fundamental issue of organizational change”).
19
Keohane, supra note 13, at 389.
20
Abbott & Snidal, supra note 14, at 22, 26.
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precipitated by a rationalist understanding of IOs. Blending a new trend of
IR theories (constructivism)21 with the identity theory in developmental
psychology, the Article probes an IO’s internal development in which one
can witness a dynamic legal process of identity formation. This
interdisciplinary approach proffers a theoretical framework that
demonstrates how an IO, as a socio-legal actor, develops, transforms, and
becomes more sophisticated.
The Article argues that based on its autonomy22 as an independent
organization—and not merely as an instrument of states—an IO forms its
organizational identity as it experiences an identity crisis similar to the way
in which a person does. Initially, states create IOs to serve a specific
function. Thus, IOs may have default purposes that their creators (states)
have programmed into them. However, an IO’s retention of this
programmed purpose results from a mere identification with its creators,
not from the genuine identity that the IO has formed at subsequent stages
during the course of its legal-institutional evolution. An IO acquires its
organizational identity only after it achieves a necessary level of
institutional maturity through legal interactions and communications with
its environment.
This process is certainly no less daunting to an IO than to a person
because an IO also suffers strains and pressures from its role expectation in
the international society. Just as an adolescent experiences an identity
crisis in interactions with peers and with society in general, an IO is
exposed to a similar ordeal in adjusting its normative goals to various
external pressures. In particular, IOs often undergo a testing situation
where their old structures grow increasingly incapable of coping with new
demands from their altered environment. Confronted with this crisis, IOs
may attempt to reconfigure their legal-institutional setting by fine-tuning
their original teleology to a call from their new environment. Only then
will the IOs’ organizational existence remain relevant, therefore, creating a
socio-legal reality23 by forming a genuine identity.
Against this backdrop, the Article attempts to theorize IOs’ legalinstitutional development as independent organizations from the standpoint
of identity formation, and tests this proposed theory by applying it to the
WTO. Part II of this Article discusses a theoretical foundation for the
21

See discussion infra Part II.B.
An IO’s autonomy may be weak or strong. A “weak autonomy” is a de jure autonomy existing
only in the book rendered by an IO’s legal personality. Yet a “strong autonomy” is a de facto autonomy
substantiated by such criteria as the size of membership, the size of bureaucracy, the frequency and
density of operation (activities), and the organizational output (norms and other behavioral guidelines).
In those institutions having a strong autonomy the process of identity-formation is an observable
phenomenon enabled by a sufficient period of organizational duration and a rich amount of institutional
experiences.
23
See MICHAEL BARNETT & MARTHA FINNEMORE, RULES FOR THE WORLD: INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATION IN GLOBAL POLITICS 6–7 (2004).
22
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analysis (i.e., the autonomy of an IO). One cannot construct an IO’s
identity without first identifying its autonomy vis-à-vis its member states.
Specifically, Part II contrasts social theories, which recognize an IO’s
autonomy, with traditional IR theories, which regard an IO as an instrument
of states. Part II also highlights identity formation as a norm-based process
engineered by rules and legal discourse.
Part III constructs a theory regarding IOs’ identity formation. Part III
first raises a case of anthropomorphism. In probing an IO’s identity
formation, one may apply an analogy of a person to an IO—both entities
are social actors that interact with their environment for survival. 24
Anthropomorphism lays a foundation for an interdisciplinary methodology
informed by social science. After sketching Erik Erikson’s celebrated
identity theory,25 Part III applies this theory to IOs, in addition to outlining
various parameters of identity formation—history, environment, goals, and
technology.
Part IV tests the theory of an IO’s identity formation by applying it to
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and its successor, the
WTO. Part IV demonstrates how the WTO experienced an identity crisis
as the original pro-trade bias embedded in its old self (GATT) embraced
new challenges involving nontrade values, such as protection of the
environment and human health. Part IV also proposes an optimal path for
the WTO’s development, which embodies an institutional balance between
traditional trade values and these nontrade values.
Finally, a disclaimer is in order. This Article does not intend to
debunk traditional IR theories generally. Granted, their parsimony may
explain state behaviors with regards to an IO more clearly than what is
proposed in the Article. In particular, to the extent that states constitute a
critical environment to an IO, powerful members’ interests may still
constrain the scope of an IO’s autonomy.26 Rather, this Article aims to fill
in some of the blind spots of traditional IR theories, such as social theories
on IOs. It purports to provide an overview on IOs’ endogenous-normative
dynamics and serve as a preliminary yet useful avenue for further
discussions in this nascent field.
II. ARE INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AUTONOMOUS?
Are IOs Autonomous? This part attempts to answer this question by
first analyzing the functional view that denies IOs’ autonomy. It then turns
to blind spots that the functional view leaves behind, such as the
24

See, e.g., Barnett & Coleman, supra note 18, at 594 (regarding IOs as actors which adopt various
strategies to cope with environmental pressures and arguing that these strategies lead to “change in their
tasks, design, and mandate”) (emphasis added).
25
See infra Part III.A.
26
Abbott & Snidal, supra note 14, at 8, 19.
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incapability of adequately explaining IOs’ institutional evolution. Finally,
this part embraces the IOs’ autonomy by probing organizational norms and
identity.
A. Functionalism and Its Discontents
Conventional IR theories tend to regard an IO as a machinery of
interstate cooperation. These theories posit that sovereign states create and
operate IOs to achieve a better world system by enmeshing them in
mutually beneficial transactions.27 This rationalistic approach highlights an
IO’s functional merits, which include reducing uncertainty and transaction
costs in the absence of any specific institutional context.28 This is an
economistic approach that assumes that states prioritize their interests to
maximize efficiency and therefore use IOs as rational instruments to
achieve such goals.29
This inorganic view of IOs may be a logical conclusion with regards
to traditional IR theories, including neorealism, which are theories about
states.30 These theories aim to analyze and understand why and how states
interact and cooperate among themselves, which is evident in their
appellation, international relations. This state centered view rejects an IO’s
ontological autonomy31 as a self-governing, purposive actor. Under this
framework, even if an IO may facilitate or constrain certain state behaviors
by creating and controlling the flow of information between states, that
causality still does not give the IO autonomy. 32 For example, to
neorealists, any meaningful contributions by IOs are made through and by
states. In sum, IOs exert no independent impact on state behavior.33
Absent autonomy, the actual operation or evolution of an IO in its
post-creation stages remains underexplored.34 Neorealists may infer certain
hypotheses about changes in an IO since its creation. 35 But those
hypotheses are unsatisfactory because an institutional change, itself, tends

27

Ness & Brechin, supra note 15, at 246; Jacobson et al., supra note 15, at 142.
Keohane, supra note 13, at 390.
29
Michael N. Barnett & Martha Finnemore, The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International
Organizations, 53 INT’L ORG. 699, 702 (1999); see also THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM IN
ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS 3–4 (Paul J. DiMaggio & Walter W. Powell eds., 1991); Anna Grandori,
Notes on the Use of Power and Efficiency Constructs in the Economics and Sociology of International
Organizations, in INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES ON ORGANIZATIONAL STUDIES 61 (S. Lindenberg
& H. Shreuder eds., 1993).
30
Barnett & Finnemore, supra note 29, at 706.
31
See id. at 704.
32
Id.
33
See John J. Mearsheimer, The False Promise of International Institutions, 19 INT’L SEC. 5 (1995).
34
Helfer, supra note 16, at 658.
35
Id.
28
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to be at odds with neorealism. Change is either bracketed36 or thrust upon
an IO by its state creators by changes in the state’s national interests or
preferences.37 Therefore, change is a recreation of an IO by states due to
asymmetrical external shocks, such as disasters, 38 rather than an
evolutionary or adaptive process resulting from continuous, incremental
institutional development. In sum, any institutional changes within an IO
are reduced back to international cooperation among states.39
Moreover, because neorealists regard an IO as a mere tool, they often
fail to heed the unique attributes and contexts deeply associated with a
particular organization. Therefore, neorealists tend to even treat effective
IOs in the same way as ineffective ones,40 seldom taking into account IOs’
variances in performance and legitimacy.
Notably, some adaptions of neorealism, such as the regime theory,41
recognize the possibility of IOs’ direct impact on states’ behaviors. 42
Regimes can be broadly defined as issue specific arrangements that
facilitate states’ cooperation by coordinating their behaviors and stabilizing
their expectations. 43 Regime theory focuses on institutions’ functional
aspects where states routinely cooperate over specific issues to reduce
uncertainty and transaction costs, provide information, and stabilize
expectations, even in the absence of centralized authority.44
Nonetheless, even this adapted position cannot fully escape from the
core realist tenet. A regime may facilitate interstate cooperation only to the
extent that such cooperation serves powerful states.45 But regime theorists
still refuse to recognize IOs’ endogenous impact on states’ behavior.46
36

See id. at 661; Ira Katznelson & Barry R. Weingast, Intersections Between Historical and Rational
Choice Institutionalism, in PREFERENCES AND SITUATIONS: POINTS OF INTERSECTION BETWEEN HISTORICAL
AND RATIONAL CHOICE INSTITUTIONALISM 1, 7 (Ira Katznelson & Barry R. Weingast eds., 2005).
37
Helfer, supra note 16, at 661.
38
Id. at 662.
39
Keohane, supra note 13, at 379.
40
Ness & Brechin, supra note 15, at 247–48 (“Few have noted that organizations differ over time,
or that they perform differently from one another, or that they achieve their ends with varying
effectiveness or efficiency.”).
41
In the 1970s, an intellectual thirst for a systematic explanation of “international governance”
amid an “anomaly” of developments, such as the relative decline of U.S. hegemony and the rise of
OEPC, gravitated many scholars toward the “international regime” theory. Friedrich Kratochwil &
John Gerard Ruggie, International Organization: A State of the Art on an Art of the State, 40 INT’L
ORG. 753, 759–60 (1986).
42
Steinberg & Zasloff, supra note 11, at 75.
43
Kratochwil & Ruggie, supra note 41, at 759–60.
44
Keohane, supra note 13, at 386.
45
See Richard H. Steinberg, In the Shadow of Law or Power? Consensus-Based Bargaining and
Outcomes in the GATT/WTO, 56 INT’L ORG. 339 (2002); Richard H. Steinberg, Judicial Lawmaking at
the WTO: Discursive, Constitutional, and Political Constraints, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 247 (2004).
46
Regime theorists still regard regimes as “outcomes,” failing to ask such questions as “to what
extent has the existence of regimes significantly affected the behavior of actors?” Verbeek, supra note
14, at 13. In some occasions, states accord an IO a false autonomy simply to deflect any direct criticism
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According to them, even the strongest cooperation facilitated by a regime
could not make it an independent organization.47 Thus, it is no wonder
that, to regime theorists, a regime is quite fragile; it exists against the
backdrop of anarchy, which constrains interstate cooperation and is hard to
achieve even when states share common interests.48 As a corollary, regime
theory fails to address two important organizational issues. First, it cannot
fully explain an organic interaction between IOs and their environment.
Second, regime theory cannot evaluate whether each regime is as legitimate
or effective as an independent organization since all of the regime’s
performance is attributable logically to states.
Neoliberal institutionalists appear to offer a more advanced
explanation of IOs’ autonomy than earlier institutionalists, such as regime
theorists. Neoliberal institutionalists acknowledge that IOs may be an
independent variable since they can condition and regulate states’
behavior. 49 Nonetheless, even under neoliberalism, an IO’s role in
international politics does not go deep enough to constitute states’ interests
and identities.50 Thus, even neoliberal institutionalists might be tempted to
circumvent global norms once they conclude that those norms are
inconsistent with their liberal agenda.
To that extent, neoliberal
institutionalists also regard regimes, and by extension IOs, as tools for
states to advance domestic values and preferences. 51 According to
neoliberal institutionalism, states would cease to support an IO if it does
not meet their demands.52
Furthermore, neoliberal institutionalism still encounters certain
difficulties in developing a genuine macro theory on IOs that fully explains
and predicts an IO’s evolution on its own terms, not due to member states’
interests or preferences.53 To neoliberal institutionalists, an IO’s disciplinary
(supranational) authority may be delegated from the member states
toward them in pursuing certain goals. Yet this is a variation of the instrumental view, not a genuine
organizational autonomy that this Article addresses. See Abbott & Snidal, supra note 14, at 18–19
(describing this variation of instrumentalism as “laundering”).
47
In this context, the regime literatures did not surpass those of general international relations even
in its heyday (1980s). See Kratochwil & Ruggie, supra note 41, at 761.
48
See Joseph M. Grieco, Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest
Liberal Institutionalism, 42 INT’L ORG. 485, 485 (1988); Claire R. Kelly, Realist Theory and Real
Constraints, 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 545, 554–55 (2004).
49
Robert O. Keohane & Lisa L. Martin, The Promise of Institutionalist Theory, 20 INT’L SEC. 39,
46 (1995).
50
Jeffrey T. Checkel, The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory, 50 WORLD POL.
324, 327–28 (1998).
51
Christian Reus-Smit, The Constitutional Structure of International Society and the Nature of
Fundamental Institutions, 51 INT’L ORG. 555, 555 (1997).
52
Barnett & Coleman, supra note , at 594.
53
Institutionalists observe that “international institutions are created in response to state interests,
and that their character is structured by the prevailing distribution of capabilities.” See Keohane &
Martin, supra note 49, at 47.
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themselves54 rather than emerging from within over time.
In sum, the rationalist primacy attributed to states and the consequent,
instrumental role of IOs does not embrace IOs’ autonomy even with
theoretical finessing.
B. Embracing the Organizational Autonomy
The Westphalian tradition of public international law, built on the
notion of state sovereignty, might not fully embrace the constructivist logic
of an IO’s ontological independence because it would undermine states’
monopoly of power. Under the traditional view, the only restriction on a
state’s sovereign power was self-restriction. 55 In other words, treaties
created by sovereign states’ consent could only regulate the concerned
states because the sovereign states had given their word, not because those
treaties constituted an autonomous organization of elevated hierarchy.
However, the traditional notion of sovereignty was vulnerable to the
Hobbesian struggle, eventually leading to two world wars. Thus, it was no
coincidence that the postwar reconstruction of international order was
conducted through independent IOs that would govern states’ behaviors.
Interestingly, postwar IOs play unique regulatory roles in certain sector
specific areas, such as collective security—the United Nations (UN)—and
international financial regulation—the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
The postwar prominence of IOs engendered new international law that
put the IOs’ legal personality and organizational autonomy under the
spotlight.56 First, Charters of IOs declared their legal personalities. Article
104 of the UN provides that “the Organization shall enjoy in the territory of
each of its Members such legal capacity as may be necessary for the
exercise of its functions and the fulfilment [sic] of its purposes.”57 Article
8:1 of the WTO Agreement also provides that the “WTO shall have legal
personality, and shall be accorded by each of its Members such legal
capacity as may be necessary for the exercise of its functions.”58
Likewise, the International Court of Justice (ICJ), in its Reparation
case, ruled that an IO is a “subject of international law and capable of

54

ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 144–45 (2005).
The classical concept of sovereignty of nation states, which was deeply territorial, emerged in
Europe at the end of the Thirty Years’ War in 1648 (the Peace of Westphalia). It meant an absolute
control of a national state within its own border. According to this historical concept, a sovereign state
answers no higher authority, including an IO. See Leo Gross, The Peace of Westphalia, 1648–1948, 42
AM. J. INT’L L. 20 (1948).
56
Before the Second World War, the notion of international personalities was debatable. See
Giuseppe Marchegiano, The Juristic Character of the International Commission of Cape Spartel
Lighthouse, 25 AM. J. INT’L L. 339, 339 (1931).
57
U.N. Charter art. 104, available at http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/index.shtml.
58
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154.
55
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possessing international rights and duties.”59 Based on this legal capability,
an IO holds the capacity to sue a state, regardless of the state’s membership
to the organization, for damage caused by a violation by the state of its
obligation toward the organization. 60 It is based on this line that the
International Law Commission (ILC) is working to create a draft article
governing IOs’ legal responsibility to seek damages from the offending
state or other IOs.61
Furthermore, modern international law also recognizes the IOs’
professional identity, accentuating their distinctive functional mandate and
competence.
For example, the ICJ rejected the World Health
Organization’s (WHO) request to deliver an advisory opinion addressing
whether states’ use of nuclear weapons violates international law because
this issue did not fall within the rubric of the WHO’s activities.62 This
decision acknowledges that each IOs’ distinguishable mission warrants
organizational autonomy.
Nonetheless, the existence of an IO’s legal personality should not
necessarily be equated with the IO’s independent status separate from its
creator-states. 63 Legal capacity may not be a sufficient condition for
genuine autonomy. Varying institutional arrangements of IOs determine
different patterns of governance and degrees of autonomy. Although the
UN has its own legal personality, the UN is incapable of making any
autonomous decisions over critical subjects, such as security, against the
will of powerful members with veto powers. Furthermore, even if an IO
enjoys a certain level of autonomy, sovereign states, which transfer part of
their autonomy to the IO, may want to retract such a transfer.64
Nonetheless, an IO’s legal-institutional detachment from its members
is still an important avenue for the IO’s socio-political autonomy. In line
with Weberian legal-rational authority in bureaucracy, legal personality
tends to benefit an IO in claiming decisional authority on various issues
and challenges falling within the rubric of its mandate. Along with this
legal capacity follows other institutional software and hardware used to
maintain its operational autonomy, such as operational rules, secretariat,

59

Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, 1949 I.C.J. 174, 179 (Apr. 11, 1949).
Id. at 179–80.
61
Analytical Guide: Responsibility of International Organizations, INT’L LAW COMM’N, http://legal.un.
org/ilc/guide/9_11.htm (last updated July 10, 2014); Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International
Organizations, INT’L LAW COMM’N, http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/draft%20articles/
9_11_2011.pdf (last visited Aug. 26, 2014).
62
Legality of the Threat and Use of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict, Advisory Opinion, 1996
I.C.J. 226 (July 8).
63
David J. Bederman, The Souls of International Organizations: Legal Personality and the Lighthouse
at Cape Spartel, 36 VA. J. INT’L L. 275, 277 (1996).
64
ANNA MEIJKNECHT, TOWARDS INTERNATIONAL PERSONALITY: THE POSITION OF MINORITIES
AND INDIGENOUS 38 (2001).
60
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and the budget. For example, an IO may demand that its members pay
dues.65
Importantly, an IO’s legal personhood enables us to employ legal
rhetoric with which we investigate and study an IO’s operation.66 Those
legal narratives offer unique perspectives in understanding an IO’s
autonomy in terms of establishing consistent precedent and providing
reasoned arguments conditioned on rules and principles, rather than
particular states’ interest.67 As discussed above, however, this normative
dynamic has blind spots under conventional IR theories.
Here, “constructivism” provides a social framework of organization
building because it highlights how the shared norms emerge in an IO,
become internalized, and eventually transform the behaviors of state
actors.68 While rationalism views that only exogenous (material) factors,
such as power and interest, determine state behaviors, constructivism
highlights that endogenous (ideational) factors, such as culture and values,
can also guide such behaviors.69 This endogenous social dynamic glues
member states together with or without material incentives. Under
constructivism, an IO’s ontological autonomy results from its social norms
composed of shared culture, knowledge, and discourse. First, social norms
provide member states with a medium through which to communicate
among, and thus understand, one another, much like a shared language.70
Second, as these norm-governed interactions proliferate the original terms
of individual identities gradually transform into a collective identity based
on the “we” notion.71
These legal discourses inform, inter alia, two paramount issues which
concern IOs’ autonomy: (1) what IOs produce, and (2) how they develop.
First, some legal scholars have highlighted noticeable norm-generating
(“jurisgenerative”) 72 phenomena in certain areas within sector specific
65
See, e.g., UN Charter art. 19 (“A Member of the United Nations which is in arrears in the
payment of its financial contributions to the Organization shall have no vote in the General Assembly if
the amount of its arrears equals or exceeds the amount of the contributions due from it for the preceding
two full years.”).
66
KIRGIS, supra note 10, at vii–viii.
67
Id. at viii.
68
Verbeek, supra note 14, at 13.
69
WENDT, supra note 16, at 215.
70
See Kenneth Abbott, Economic Issues and Political Participation: The Evolving Boundaries of
International Federalism, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 971, 974 (1996); Andrew T. F. Lang, Reconstructing
Embedded Liberalism: John Gerard Ruggie and Constructivist Approaches to the Study of the
International Trade Regime, 9 J. INT’L ECON. L. 81, 84–85, 95, 105–06 (2006) (employing a
“constructivist” perspective on the WTO system). Regarding the communicative action in a society in
general, see JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE
THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY 11 (William Rehg trans., MIT Press 1998).
71
Alexander Wendt, Collective Identity Formation and the International State, 88 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 384, 388–91 (1994) [hereinafter International State].
72
Robert M. Cover, Nomos and Narrative, in NARRATIVE, VIOLENCE, AND THE LAW: THE
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regulatory IOs. These scholars focus on vibrant government regulatory
networks harbored by IOs in which epistemic socialization among likeminded government officials and other professionals crystallize into
tangible normative products, such as guidelines and recommendations.73
Markedly, legally defined mandates and membership flowing from, and
anchored by, an IO’s legal personality tend to secure specialization and
professional authority for these IOs. These regulatory IOs are represented
not by government officials from the Department of State or the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs but by transgovernmental regulators from sector-specific
departments, such as the Department of Treasury or the Ministry of
Finance, whose common set of belief transcends national boundaries.74 An
IO’s legal personality tends to promote this mentalités collectives by
providing professional forums that enjoy a certain level of detachment from
a culture of direct delegation.75
For example, the International Organization of Securities
Commissions (IOSCO) harbors a transgovernmental network of securities
regulators whose collective goals are articulated in a professional, not
ambassadorial, fashion (i.e., to “establish standards and an effective
surveillance of international securities transactions”).76 The IOSCO has
issued a number of professional standards within its mandate, such as the
“Risk Management and Control Guidance for Securities Firms and their
Supervisors.”77 Despite its nonbinding nature, firms in each jurisdiction

ARTICLES OF ROBERT COVER 110 (Martha Minow et al. eds., 1992).
73
See Anne-Marie Slaughter, Governing the Global Economy Through Government Networks, in
THE ROLE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW 178 (Michael Byers ed., 2000); SLAUGHTER, supra note 54; Sungjoon Cho,
Transgovernmentalism: A New Jurisgenerative Mechanism (forthcoming) (on file with author). This
idea of transgovernmental government networks dates back to the 1970s. See Robert O. Keohane &
Joseph S. Nye, Transgovernmental Relations and International Organizations, 27 WORLD POL. 39, 44
(1974); Raymond F. Hopkins, Global Management Networks: The Internationalization of Domestic
Bureaucracies, 30 INT. SOC. SCI. J. 31, 31 (1978). Some scholars describe this term differently, but
more or less give it the same meaning. For instance, one scholar named the Basel Accord as a
“gentlemen’s agreement among central banks.” Hal Scott, The Competitive Implications of the Basel
Capital Accord, 39 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 885, 885 (1995). Another scholar termed the same work as
“international soft law.” JOSEPH JUDE NORTON, DEVISING INTERNATIONAL BANK SUPERVISORY
STANDARDS 176–77, 261–62 (1995).
74
John E. Shockey, Bank Regulatory Examination and Enforcement After Barings and Daiwa, 935
PLI/CORP. 681, 708 (1996).
75
John Gerard Ruggie, Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International
Relations, 47 INT’L ORG. 139, 157 (1993).
76
General Information on IOSCO, INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS (IOSCO), http://www.iosco.org/
about/ (last visited Aug. 26, 2014).
77
IOSCO, RISK MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL GUIDANCE FOR SECURITIES FIRMS AND THEIR
SUPERVISORS: A REPORT BY THE TECHNICAL COMMITTEE OF THE INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF
SECURITIES COMMISSIONS 1 (May 1998), available at http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOS
COPD78.pdf.
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expect to implement these regulatory prototypes. 78 This normative
authority, as it is repeated and reinforced, equips these IOs with an aura of
professional legitimacy, which in turn leads to a level of self-governance.
Second, an IO’s legal personality is also inductive of a dynamic
understanding of its authentic institutional self. Since the juridical
personhood warrants a certain level of permanence in its institutional
existence, in particular vis-à-vis agreements (treaties), one can engage in a
serious exploration of an IO’s unique pathway from creation through
institutional evolution as a legally distinct entity (person). This facilitates a
panoramic comprehension of the IO’s operational autonomy. From a
normative perspective, forming an IO’s identity means establishing
institutional criteria for behaviors or policies acceptable to the IO.
Throughout its institutional lifetime, an IO embraces a different set of
policies determined by its own understanding of its rationale (object and
purpose).
Finally, an IO’s autonomy should not translate into its disconnection
from the environment. The natural or open system perspective views IOs
as social groups desiring to survive by adapting to their particular
environment.79 Therefore, organizations are even capable of modifying
their original goals to survive in the changing environment. Philip
Selznick’s celebrated institutional approach perfects this theory of
organizational autonomy from the standpoint of this natural or open
system. 80 According to Selznick, institutionalization enables social
integration within an organization by converting randomly scattered
technical activities into regularized and meaningful patterns.81 Crucially,
this institutionalization presupposes an open system that is distinguishable
from a closed system, such as a cybernetic machine, which passively
channels states’ inputs. By actively interacting with the environment, an
organization obtains both special capacity and character, 82 while also
establishing its value.83
C. Summary
To sum up the argument presented above, conventional IR theories,
often dubbed as rationalism, treat IOs as mere instruments to aid states
achieve various functional needs. An instrument does not have its own
autonomy—a logical conclusion from intrinsic theoretical assumptions of
78

Id.
See RICHARD W. SCOTT, ORGANIZATIONS: RATIONAL, NATURAL, AND OPEN SYSTEMS 57 (3d ed.
1992); Alvin W. Gouldner, Organizational Analysis, in SOCIOLOGY TODAY 404–05 (1959).
80
See generally PHILIP SELZNICK, LEADERSHIP IN ADMINISTRATION 17 (1957).
81
LEONARD BROOM & PHILIP SELZNICK, SOCIOLOGY 238 (1955).
82
Philip Selznick, Institutionalism “Old” and “New,” 41 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 270 (1996).
83
SELZNICK, supra note 80, at 17.
79
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rationalism. Under rationalism, material incentives are sole determinants
for state behaviors while states’ interests are prefixed.
However, the social approach proposed in this Article focuses on the
rich socio-legal dynamic within an IO. Legal discourses among states
within an IO, if regularized and institutionalized, transform states’
perception of interest and identity. The emergence of an IO’s autonomy
parallels a gradual shift from the original individual identities of states to
an IO’s collective identity. The next part explores the formation of this
collective identity.
III. THEORIZING AN IDENTITY FORMATION OF
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
Having demonstrated that instrumentalism is misguided and should be
replaced by autonomism, this part attempts to theorize the dynamic process
of an IO’s identity formation by drawing on human psychology. This
theoretical borrowing or analogy may be controversial. Nonetheless, a
common operational structure exists between an IO and a human being,
particularly the way that each entity responds to and interacts with its
environment for survival and development. This common structure
eventually warrants the interdisciplinary approach. The identity theory in
developmental psychology can be a useful theoretical avenue to illustrate
an IO’s dynamic transformation in its life cycle, which remains largely
unexplained by the traditional IR theories.
A. The Identity Theory: Borrowing Insights from Psychology
A person’s identity impacts every aspect of her life, such as habit
formation and interaction with others. 84 A preeminent developmental
psychologist, Erik Erikson, suggested that a human being develops her
identity by combining her understanding of the environment (group
identity) and her own personal characters (personal identity).85 Erikson’s
approach is often dubbed psychosocial; he posited that the individual and
society are closely interrelated in their dynamic changes.86 His theory
generally interlocks societal demands with individual development forces

84

See Amélie O. Rorty & David Wong, Aspects of Identity and Agency, in IDENTITY, CHARACTER,
19 (1990).
85
See ERIK H. ERIKSON, IDENTITY, YOUTH AND CRISIS (1968) [hereinafter CRISIS]; see also
Willem L. Wardekker, Identity, Plurality, and Education, in THE YEARBOOK OF PHILOSOPHY OF
EDUCATION (1995).
86
CRISIS, supra note 85, at 114; see also Jane Kroger, Identity Formation, in THE FUTURE OF
IDENTITY: CENTENNIAL REFLECTIONS ON THE LEGACY OF ERIK ERIKSON 61–63 (Kenneth Hoover ed.,
2004); JANE KROGER, IDENTITY DEVELOPMENT: ADOLESCENCE THROUGH ADULTHOOD 25 (2d ed. 2007).
AND MORALITY: ARTICLES IN MORAL PSYCHOLOGY
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in discussing identity and its formation.87
In particular, Erikson’s theory of identity formation focuses on a
dynamic pathway of human psychology in which an individual human
being searches for, and eventually establishes, her genuine identity. This
dynamic pathway is based on a human being’s need to cope incessantly
with the inevitable conflicts between prior and subsequent identifications
with the environment as well as between the different social roles that these
identifications may carry with them. Erikson posited an epigenic
development model of identity formation in which every individual human
being traverses through various stages in a life cycle, with each stage
having its own set of circumstances of particular sensitivity, identity crisis,
and potential.88 The individual becomes a different person in each stage
with different cognitive capacities and increasingly develops an ability to
interact with a wider range of people.
1. Identity Formation: An Early Stage
Infants identify themselves entirely with their parents. 89
Subsequently, children also tend to attach themselves to other particular
adults around them, such as their teachers and parents of their friends, and
often imitate these adults’ occupations. 90
Erikson characterized
adolescence as a transition period from childhood into adulthood where an
adolescent is engaged in the process of defining his own existence.91 In
adolescence, the former function of identification and attachment to values
and roles, based on those of individuals one admires, is replaced by identity
formation.92
The adolescent declares a moratorium on adulthood while
experimenting with different roles.93 Erikson wrote that, during this stage,
adolescents focus on defining themselves in terms of what they believe,
what their goals are, and where they fit in society.94 Adolescence, as the
last stage of childhood, ends only when an individual replaces her
childhood identifications with a new type of identification resulting from
87

See KROGER, supra note 86, at 25.
See CRISIS, supra note 85, at 91–141 (describing the different stages of the human life cycle).
89
Id. at 115.
90
Id. at 122.
91
Id. at 156–65.
92
Id. at 22–23 (“Identity formation employs a process of simultaneous reflection and observation, a
process taking place on all levels of mental functioning, by which the individual judges himself in the
light of what he perceived to be the way in which others judge him in comparison to themselves and to
a typology significant to them; while he judges their way of judging him in the light of how he
perceived himself in comparison to them and to types that have become relevant to him.”).
93
See id. at 128 (explaining the developmental challenges of adolescents as they develop a sense of
identity).
94
ERIK H. ERIKSON, CHILDHOOD AND SOCIETY 261–63 (1950).
88
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socialization and competition among its peers, which reveals the
individual’s own integrated values and preferences.95 An individual will be
formed only after the careful denial and assimilation of childhood
identifications are attuned to a new configuration recognized by society.
2. Identity Formation: An Identity Crisis
The final identity, although it includes all significant identifications
with key figures of the past, processes them in a way that builds a
distinctive yet sensibly coherent whole.96 During the final stage of identity
formation, adolescents tend to suffer greatly from role confusion.97 Past
multiple identifications, and the roles that they prescribe, often conflict
with one other. This disturbance is tantamount to a crisis or “a war within
themselves.”98
Adolescents acquire a sense of direction only after weathering this
Strum und Drang. 99 Then, they finally discover their suitability in
society.100 In this sense, the identity crisis is more of a rite of passage,
rather than a calamity.101 Erikson argued that the successful resolution of
the identity crisis had a long lasting impact on the future stability and
security of the individual and their ability to uphold commitments, deal
with future hardships, and sustain relationships.102
3. The Failure of Identity Formation
Identity formation is not always successful. Adolescents often
demonstrate a variety of pathological symptoms in the course of identity
formation. They may fail to resolve tension in their engagement with
others, which leads to a state of disorientation.103 Erikson has labeled these
pathologies as “identity confusion” or “identity diffusion.” For example,
they may make no commitments, or show no fidelity, to their genuine
identity, as they do not experience an identity crisis.104 They may also act
baby-like (“diffusion of time perspective”), become unable to work or

95

Id. at 155.
Id. at 161.
97
Id. at 163–64.
98
CRISIS, supra note 85, at 17.
99
Id. at 165.
100
Id. at 161.
101
Id. at 16.
102
Id. at 165.
103
Id. at 212.
104
See James E. Marcia, Development and Validation of Ego Identity Statuses, 3 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSY. 551–58 (1966). To some scholars identity diffusion may be characterized as “identity
deficit” or “motivation crisis,” which denotes a lack of commitments and precise self-definition. Roy F.
Baumeister et al., Two Kinds of Identity Crisis, 53 J. PERSONALITY 407, 409–11 (1985).
96
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concentrate (“diffusion of industry”), or choose to be antisocial and hostile
(“negative identity”).105
Other problematic identity statuses include “foreclosure” and
“moratorium.” Foreclosure refers to a state in which adolescents have
already made commitments to a certain identity without seriously exploring
various identities available. Moratorium means that adolescents merely
engage in such exploration without making any commitments.106 In both
situations, adolescents fail to form a genuine identity by the lack of either
the search itself or accompanied commitments.
B. Is an International Organization a Person?
1. A Case for Anthropomorphism
Applying a psychological theory, such as Erikson’s identity theory, to
an IO’s operation necessitates a certain degree of anthropomorphism,
which has its limits. Simply, one might not equate an IO’s identity with
that of a person. After all, an IO’s identity may not be as coherent as that
of a person since biology tends to accord her a more unitary identity than
that of a corporate agency such as an IO.107 It is also conceivable that a
tension exists within an IO’s identity, more precisely between an IO’s
collective identity and some states’ individual identities.108 Under certain
circumstances, the short term interest of some powerful member states may
undermine the unitary nature of the IO’s holistic institutional structure
represented by the collective identity.
Nonetheless, it is still true that both a person’s behavior and an IO’s
operation can be observed as an outcome of each entity’s own
intentionality. An IO’s action is no more reducible to its individual
member states than a human action is reducible to chemical reactions in the
brain.109 In so far as both a person’s behavior and an IO’s action can be
observed as real on its own terms, one can explain and predict such
behavior and action.110 To this extent, one could draw on psychology, such
as Erikson’s identity theory, to better understand the identity dynamics of
an IO, bearing in mind the aforementioned caveat on anthropomorphism.
Again, sociologist narratives tend to make unique contributions in
accommodating anthropomorphism to understand IOs’ operational
autonomy in their organizational lifetimes (i.e., how they evolve and what
they generate), which eventually supply the foundation for the formation of
105
106
107
108
109
110
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their identities. One way of advancing an IO’s identity formation is to
project this dynamic process into a well-established paradigm of human
developmental psychology. Carefully reflecting on an IO’s operational
nature tends to warrant this anthropomorphism.
As a juridical person, an IO is an autonomous, organic entity that
owes its existence to its own incessant adaptations to its ever-changing
environment, much like a human being. Unlike a closed system, such as a
cybernetic system, in which inputs from the environment can never change
internal elements of an organization, both humans and organizations are
open systems that can self-sustain by adjusting to the environment.111 The
environment provides an organization with necessary material resources,
such as hardware (physical infrastructure), software (technology), and
“humanware” (staff), as well as symbolic resources, such as reputation.112
This shift in the analytical focus from a closed to open system highlights
the critical significance that the environment exerts on organizational
identity,113 as it does on the human identity. Like a human being, an
organization pursues a homeostatic equilibrium vis-à-vis the external
environment as it builds and adapts its individuality in its institutional
development.114
2. A Corporate Identity as a Supporting Analogy
In fact, some organization theorists have already devoted their
attention to certain self-conceptions collectively held by members of an
organization such as a corporation. This “corporate identity” can be
defined as a consistent and durable set of values that each organization
uniquely holds.115 The corporate identity offers yet more support for using
an identity theory analogy in studying the dynamic transformation of
IOs.116
Indeed, many scholars of business administration have focused on a
corporate identity, drawing on lessons from psychology. Their common
observation is that a corporation, like a human being, develops its identity
through an unremitting process of interaction with its environment for its
own survival. 117 At the same time, a corporation’s identity formation
process is also normative in that human beings and corporations pursue
111
See SCOTT, supra note 79, at 89; WALTER BUCKLEY, SOCIOLOGY AND MODERN SYSTEMS
THEORY 50 (1967).
112
See Barnett & Coleman, supra note 18, at 597, 599.
113
See Ness & Brechin, supra note 15, at 249.
114
See SCOTT, supra note 79, at 60.
115
See Stuart Albert & David A. Whetten, Organizational Identity, in 6 RESEARCH IN
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR 265 (L. L. Cummings & B. M. Staw eds., 1985).
116
See Dennis Bromley, Relationships Between Personal and Corporate Reputation, 35 EUR. J. OF
MARKETING 316, 318 (2001) (observing the tendency to “personify” an organization).
117
See Peter Gorb, The Psychology of Corporate Identity, 10 EUR. MGMT. J. 310, 312 (1992).
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individual and corporate ideals, respectively, as they decide how they
should respond to challenges from their environment.118
Shortly after its creation, a corporation tends to be highly utilitarian
and is identified with its leader’s ideology.119 A corporation, like a human
being, desires to preserve its self-esteem and avoids any psychological pain
and discomfort by mobilizing various defense mechanisms.120 However, to
survive the challenging environment through capacity building, a
“learning” corporation embraces evolving identities through critical selfreflection and discourse about future identities.121 Since an identity is of an
enduring and conservative nature, its development process may be
unstable, as in the case of an adolescent.122
A corporation adjusts its original identity to the need of its
environment as it internally reflects on its external perception (images)
received from the environment, including the media, regulators,
competitors, and customers. 123 As a corporation responds to external
challenges, its members form an internal normative belief through
socialization which defies the original identity identified with its founder’s
ideology.124
C. Toward a Theory of an International Organization’s Identity
Against the background discussed above, the first point of analogy
from Erikson’s identity theory to an IO’s identity theory is an actor’s
transformative interaction with its environment. Similar to adolescents’
identity formation process, both corporations and IOs also experience
certain socialization pressures from their environment. As a result, these
organizations are often forced to diversify their institutional selves into
multiple roles that should eventually be integrated into an internally
coherent identity.125 Naturally, identity formation is not a smooth process
for either a human being or an organization. It may be accompanied by
confusion, fatigue, and stress. In short, it is a crisis.

118

See Bromley, supra note 116, at 330.
See Henry Mintzberg, Power and Organizational Life Cycles, 9 ACAD. OF MGMT. REV. 207, 210 (1984).
120
See Andrew D. Brown & Ken Starkey, Organizational Identity and Learning: A Psychodynamic
Perspective, 25 ACAD. OF MGMT. REV. 102, 104 (2000).
121
See id. at 108. Brown and Starkey call a learning organization a “wise” organization. Id. at 113.
122
See Dennis A. Gioia et al., Organizational Identity, Image, and Adaptive Instability, 25 ACAD.
OF MGMT. REV. 63, 65 (2000).
123
See id. at 65, 70.
124
See Mintzberg, supra note 119, at 210, 211.
125
See Susan Harter, Self and Identity Development, in AT THE THRESHOLD: THE DEVELOPING
ADOLESCENT 358 (S. Shirley Feldman & Glen R. Elliott eds., 1990).
119
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1. Identity Formation: An Early Stage
Under Erikson’s identity theory, children identify themselves with
their parents, and to be more precise, with their parents’ culture and value
system. This domestic dimension of historical legacy is thrust upon
children as the first factor that provides a foundation for their identity
formation. In case of a corporation, its founders often leave enduring
impacts, both positive and negative, on its subsequent development of
corporate identity.126
Likewise, the founding history of an IO renders an initial influence on
their identities. As an internalized past, this history tends to determine, or
at least correlate with, present and future behaviors of IOs by frontloading
founding states’ rationale and character. Like DNA in the human body, the
organizational history bestows upon IOs a certain institutional heredity,
thereby marking a unique path dependence for each organization. The
organizational history is often used as an interpretive criterion for
determining whether organizations’ or their participants’ behavior is
permitted or prohibited under their charters or constitutions.127
Interestingly, the tenacious impact of history on each IO’s identity
formation stems from the fact that it cannot be simply discarded or
disposed of even if it subsequently becomes obsolete or ineffective.
Purging an old organization and restarting afresh would be costly. In this
sense, all institutional changes tend to be path dependent. More often than
not, sunk costs make old patterns survive a long time before new ones
prove the former obsolete.128 Old habits die hard and relics of the former
structure or culture remain even though they might be cocooned beneath a
new institutional coating.
2. Identity Formation: An Identity Crisis
As is the case in human identity formation, the environment is a
critical parameter to the formation of an organizational identity. An
organizational identity is shaped by an IO’s conscious interactions with the
environment and guided by an organization’s role expectation, as well as
the expectations that the organization perceives from its environment
(society). Organizational sociologists have long adhered to an open system
where varying environments exert critical impact on how organizations

126
See Henry Mintzberg, Power and Organizational Life Cycles, 9 ACAD. OF MGMT. REV. 207,
209–10 (1984).
127
See, e.g., Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties pmbl., art. 32, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331, 332 (“Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the
preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion . . . .”) (emphasis added).
128
See ARTHUR L. STINCHCOMBE, CONSTRUCTING SOCIAL THEORIES 120–21 (1968).
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behave and perform.129 This unremitting process of challenge and response
between an IO and the environment can be viewed as an IO’s identity
crisis. An IO processes complex information provided by the environment
and forms its identity in accordance with the messages contained in those
challenges. 130 In this sense, an IO’s identity crisis emerges amid an
assiduous dialogue with the environment.131
As a legal person, an IO’s identity crisis can be translated into a
normative process. As discussed above, identity forming organizational
changes, which are inevitable for an IO’s institutional survival, are
basically teleological132 and constitutive since these changes define and
redefine its organizational goals, and thus regulate the behavior of members
and the organization itself.133 This teleological and constitutive process is
best captured by norms and legal discourse within an IO. Legal principles
and legal arguments mediate intersubjective discourse and interaction
among members, as well as between members and the IO itself.134
Organizational goals are a leitmotif of an IO’s norm driven identity
crisis. They are the rationale of its existence. Initially, they are given by
an IO’s creators (states) and often engraved in its charter. Organizational
goals provide essential interpretive guidance when IOs’ determine whether
a certain action is acceptable.135 In this regard, as Selznick noted, an
organizational goal can be an “ideological weapon” with which to defy
opposition and mobilize support from the environment.136
Yet as an IO achieves its identity through dynamic (historical)
development, it also alters, or at least fine tunes, the original objective and
purpose, as adolescents depart from the earlier deep identifications with
their parents. In other words, organizational goals must be adjustable for

129
See HOWARD ALDRICH, ORGANIZATIONS AND ENVIRONMENTS 254 (1979); see also Matthias
Finger & Bérangère Ruchat, The Transformation of International Public Organizations: The Case of
UNCTAD 3 (IDHEAP, Working Paper No. 14, 2000) (discussing “organizational transformation”
which an IO experiences in order to “bring organizational structure, culture, and purpose in line with
perceived environmental requirements”).
130
See Yash P. Gupta & David C.W. Chin, Organizational Life Cycle: A Review and Proposed
Directions for Research, 30 MID-ATLANTIC J. BUS. 15 (1994).
131
Cf. Joel P. Trachtman, The Constitutions of the WTO, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 623, 625 (2006)
(stating that “due to its dependence on and interaction with the broader international legal system, it is
not possible to analyze the WTO constitution fully without analyzing the broader structure”).
132
See Ness & Brechin, supra note 15, at 246.
133
See Keohane, supra note 13, at 382 (observing that “institutions do not merely reflect the
preferences and power of the units constituting them; the institutions themselves shape those
preferences and that power” and that “institutions are therefore constitutive of actors as well as vice
versa”) (emphasis added).
134
See generally Alexander Wendt, Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of
Power Politics, 46 INT’L ORG. 391 (1992).
135
See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 127, art. 31.
136
PHILIP SELZNICK, TVA AND THE GRASS ROOTS: A STUDY IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF FORMAL
ORGANIZATION (1949); SCOTT, supra note 79, at 292.
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organizations to survive. 137 Empirical confirmations for this goal
dynamism are seen in the phenomena of “mission creep” of major
international organizations, such as the IMF and the World Bank.138 For
example, an internal teleological interpretation has modified the identity of
World Bank from a narrow development organization as stipulated in
Article 1 of its charter (Articles of Agreement), which would more or less
tackle members’ economic well-being calculated by per capita income, to a
more broadly mandated organization that now addresses comprehensive
sociocultural issues, such as women’s rights, the environment, education,
and health.139
If organizational goals are a subjective dimension of recurring theme
in an IO’s identity crisis, its technology is an objective one. An IO’s
technology refers to its functional capability to perform in order to achieve
its goals. 140 It delineates its domain, and eventually its identity, by
determining what kinds of products or services it may provide for whom.141
For example, the IMF’s identity as a financial organization is inextricably
linked to the fact that it is capable of monitoring and regulating
international financial flows.
The identity of the World Health
Organization (WHO) as a health organization is also connected inseparably
to the fact that it can monitor and regulate health related matters, such as
the distribution of flu vaccines. The International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA)’s identity as a nuclear energy organization hinges on the fact that it
can monitor and regulate nuclear energy issues, such as peaceful use of
atomic energy.
Yet as an open system, an organization can also import technology
from its environment.142 Experiencing the identity crisis as it interacts with
the environment, an organization can change the core technology by
modifying its software (skills and other social knowledge), “humanware”
(personnel and bureaucrats), and hardware (infrastructure and suborganizations).143 Organizational theories characterize this transformative
137

See Ness & Brechin, supra note 15, at 264; Gouldner, supra note 79, at 404–05.
See, e.g., Jessica Einhorn, The World Bank’s Mission Creep, 80 FOREIGN AFF. (Sept./Oct. 2001)
(arguing that World Bank member countries should control the currently unwieldy status of mission
creep by devolving some of the World Bank’s derivative missions to other institutions and focus more
on its original, basic mission); Sarah Babb & Ariel Buira, Mission Creep, Mission Push and Discretion
in Sociological Perspective: The Case of IMF Conditionality (2004) (discussing the IMF’s expanded
mandate over the years).
139
See Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, The Dynamic Evolution of International Organizations: The Case of
the World Bank, 2 J. HIS. INT’L L. 217, 249 (2000); Georg Ress, The Interpretation of the Charter, THE
CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 28 (Bruno Simma et al. eds., 1994) (discussing
“evolutionary dynamic interpretation”).
140
See SCOTT, supra note 79.
141
See id. at 126; Sol Levine & Paul White, Exchange as a Conceptual Framework for the Study of
Interorganizational Relationships, 5 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 583 (1961); Ness & Brechin, supra note 15, at 256.
142
See SCOTT, supra note 79, at 23.
143
See Ness & Brechin, supra note 15, at 256.
138
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process of acquiring and embracing new technologies as “organizational
learning.”144 Organizational learning is a purposeful behavior to increase
IOs’ problem solving (functional) capacities in order to achieve certain
institutional goals and therefore plays a critical role in shaping
organizational identities.
3. The Failure of Identity Formation
If an IO cannot survive its identity crisis, it fails to achieve its true
identity. First, in the face of challenges by the changing environment, it
may still remain attached to an old identification prescribed by its creators,
i.e., states. This unresponsiveness to the environment, which may be
equivalent to “foreclosure” in human psychology, eventually leads to
“inefficient, self-defeating behavior.”145
Second, if an IO is confused by multiple identifications and fails to
commit itself to one coherent identity, its identity is diffused (“identity
diffusion”). Identity diffusion, like foreclosure, is a pathological symptom.
It gravely reduces the output level of an IO. IOs may even cease to exist
due to these pathologies.146
D. Summary
This part first introduces Erik Erikson’s identity theory that explains a
human being’s identity formation from a psycho-social perspective. To the
extent that an organic entity, be it a corporation or an IO, develops as it
continuously interacts with its environment, we could draw on Erikson’s
identity theory. This part draws on the recent literature on the corporate
identity to demonstrate that scholars of business administration have
already employed such a psychological approach in the studies of a
corporation’s life cycle.
Against this backdrop, the part theorizes an IO’s identity formation.
At an early stage, an IO, as does an infant, identifies its goal with its
founders (states). Subsequently, however, an IO faces a moment of crisis
as its original goal proves to be inadequate given new challenges from the
environment. In response, norm oriented, teleological discourses within an
IO adjust or modify its original goal in a way that addresses those

144
See Bernd Siebenhüner, International Organisations as Learning Agents in the Emerging
System of Global Governance. A Conceptual Framework, at 16–17 (Global Governance Project,
Working Paper No. 8, 2003), available at http://www.glogov.org/images/doc/WP8.pdf.
145
Barnett & Finnemore, supra note 29, at 722–24 (discussing “insulation” as one of IOs’
pathologies).
146
See Cheryl Shanks et al., Inertia and Change in the Constellation of International Governmental
Organizations, 1981–1992, 50 INT’L ORG. 593, 594 (1996) (observing that IOs “do have a mortality
rate, and it can be surprisingly high”).
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environmental challenges. Through this turbulent process (identity crisis)
emerges an IO’s collective identity, which is distinguishable from its
members’ individual identities.
The next part applies this IO identity formation theory to the WTO to
better understand its historical development as an organization.
IV. A CASE STUDY: THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION
The previous part presents a theory of identity formation of an IO
drawing from Erik Erikson’s identity theory. This part applies it to the
World Trade Organization (WTO). In its inception, the GATT, the WTO’s
predecessor, was created to fight against protectionism that had wreaked
havoc on the world economy in the interwar period. It had started as a
contract among a handful of states, with a strong leadership from the
United States. Its framers had wanted the GATT to remain basically as a
vehicle to coordinate tariff reduction negotiations and monitor protectionist
policies. Thus, in early days the GATT could be identified with this rather
functional arrangement under which state-oriented diplomacy prevailed
over legal discourse. Trade liberalization characterized its identity.
However, the GATT’s original pro-trade bias began to encounter
enormous pressure from its environment as concerns for social hygiene
increased all across the world in the Eighties. Outside criticisms of the
GATT’s original goal, and its identity, prompted the GATT to embrace a
more mature teleology that can reconcile trade and nontrade (regulatory)
value. In other words, the GATT underwent an identity crisis as it was
forced to rethink its original pro-trade goal and transform itself into a new
organization with a more balanced, integrationist identity, i.e., the WTO.
This part envisions an optimal path for the WTO’s development,
which embodies a normatively ideal manifestation of the WTO’s identity.
It might be analogous to a psychologically sound state of identity formation
in a human being. To the WTO, it represents an institutional balance
between traditional trade values and these nontrade values.
A. Identity Formation: An Early Stage
As one of the many chapters of a much more ambitious yet eventually
aborted project of the International Trade Organization (ITO), GATT was
originally more of a contractual document than an organization. In fact,
GATT participants were named contracting parties, not members. They
created the GATT against the background of mutually destructive
protectionist trade policies in the interwar period, which had diminished
world trade by seventy percent and thus contributed to the outbreak of
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World War II. 147 Drawing on this bitter historical lesson, contracting
parties aimed to dismantle trade barriers, mostly tariffs, by holding regular
trade talks in a series of negotiation rounds provided by GATT.
Therefore, GATT’s early identity as a tariff reduction arrangement can
be said to have been identified with its creators, as children often identify
their life goals with those of their parents. On the other hand, GATT’s
early identification with a strong pro-trade bias was a logical conclusion
from the relative lack of its organizational autonomy. After all, the GATT
was an instrument (contract) created by a handful of states (contracting
parties).
Notably, GATT’s functional nature, in its early days, is evidenced by
the relics of private contract law embedded in old GATT jurisprudence.
Since trade negotiation was basically a reciprocal exercise, contracting
parties had to preserve the hard won delicate balance of concessions that
each negotiation had produced. They had to maintain the values of those
concessions by prohibiting parties from introducing any measures that
might neutralize them later. Such cheating had to be condemned, and
remedies instituted to restore the balance of concessions.
As a
contractarian tool, GATT was identified with its creators’ intention to
preserve original terms of reciprocal bargains.
Given this history, GATT’s earlier, remedial prototype was
“nullification or impairment,” which is close to the notion of injuries in
contract law. Regardless of whether the measure in question is consistent
with GATT norms, any injuries to a contracting party, namely the dilution
of benefits of its concession should be remedied to preserve the balance of
concessions made in the previous negotiation.148 In practice, these injuries
meant actual adverse commercial effects to the complainant exporting
country, such as the loss of exports, which the defendant importing
country’s measure caused.149
B. Identity Formation: An Identity Crisis
As the environment surrounding GATT began to change dramatically in
the 1980s, the GATT’s early identity of a pro-trade bias came under attack.
The rising ethos of the welfare state urged governments to improve social

147

See Edward C. Luck, American Exceptionalism and International Organization: Lessons from
the 1990s, in U.S. HEGEMONY AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: THE UNITED STATES AND
MULTILATERAL INSTITUTIONS 25, 39 (Rosemary Foot et al. eds., 2003) (quoting remarks by former
U.S. Trade Representative Charlene Barshefsky on U.S. trade policy and the WTO on March 2, 2000).
148
See Sungjoon Cho, The Nature of Remedies in International Trade Law, 65 U. PITT. L. REV.
763, 766–67 (2004) (discussing the GATT/WTO multilateral trading system’s institutional evolution
from a negotiated contract to a legalized regime).
149
See, e.g., Italian Discrimination against Imported Agricultural Machinery, ¶ 17, 20 (Oct. 23,
1958), GATT B.I.S.D. (7th Supp.) at 60 (1959).
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hygiene in the areas of environment and human health. The problem,
however, was that the proliferation of these social regulations tended to
potentially undermine the GATT’s early goal of trade liberalization.
Diverging domestic regulations in different countries became increasingly
trade restrictive in times of growing interdependence. 150 Under certain
circumstances, these new domestic regulations, such as nontariff barriers
(NTBs), could be abused as a disguised form of protectionism.151
GATT first resisted the rising tide of reregulation by striking down
these regulations as simply trade restrictive. Although there existed the
General Exception Clause, GATT Article XX, under which these
regulations might be justified, not a single measure was ever actually saved
under the clause in the GATT’s history.152 For example, in 1990, a GATT
panel struck down the Thai ban on foreign cigarettes as an unnecessary
trade restriction.153 In that case, the Thai government tried to protect its
people from a number of identifiable harms from chemicals and toxins
contained in foreign cigarettes by banning those products. In fact, the
WHO endorsed the ban. However, the panel ruled that the ban was an
unjustifiable violation of the GATT rules because the Thai government
could have found less trade-restrictive means than the ban, such as the
“strict,
nondiscriminatory
labeling
and
ingredient
disclosure

150
A number of scholars have already paid attention to this phenomenon. For instance, Sol
Picciotto observed that “[r]egulatory regimes have been brought into greater interaction as the removal
of direct barriers to the flows of goods and money between states (tariffs, quotas and exchange controls)
has shifted attention towards regulatory difference as a barrier to entry of commodities or capital.” Sol
Picciotto, The Regulatory Criss-Cross: Interaction Between Jurisdictions and the Construction of
Global Regulatory Networks, in INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY COMPETITION AND COORDINATION:
PERSPECTIVES ON ECONOMIC REGULATION IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES 89 (William Bratton et
al. eds., 1996). Likewise, some economists have also noted that:

As globalization proceeds, however, it has become increasingly evident that one nation’s
economic policies can affect other countries. When nations were separated by high trade
barriers and trade flows were limited, one country could ignore another nation’s
domestic economic policies. As barriers have come down, other countries’ domestic
policies have become much more important.
GLOBAPHOBIA: CONFRONTING FEARS ABOUT OPEN TRADE 89 (Gary Burtless et al eds., 1998); see also
Aaditya Mattoo, Discriminatory Consequences of Non-Discriminatory Standards (WTO, Working
Paper No. TISD-96-01, 1996), available at http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/reser_e/tisd9601_e.htm.
151
See Sungjoon Cho, Linkage of Free Trade and Social Regulation: Moving Beyond the Entropic
Dilemma, 5 CHI. J. INT’L L. 625, 643–44 (2005).
152
See Robert Howse, Managing the Interface Between International Trade Law and the
Regulatory State: What Lessons Should (and Should Not) Be Drawn from the Jurisprudence of the
United States Dormant Commerce Clause, in REGULATORY BARRIERS AND THE PRINCIPLE OF NONDISCRIMINATION IN WORLD TRADE LAW 142 (Thomas Cottier & Petros C. Mavroidis eds., 2000).
153
Thailand—Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes, WORLD TRADE
ORG. (Oct. 5, 1990), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/90cigart.pdf.
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regulations.”154 This ruling was severely criticized, not only because it
ignored the WHO’s opinion, but also because its prescription to the Thai
government (i.e., labeling and disclosure regulations) was both
unaffordable and ineffective for developing countries like Thailand at that
time.155
Therefore, while a pro-trade bias was faithful to GATT’s
identification as a trade agreement, this bias continuously invited criticism
from its environment, in particular civil society and environmental
organizations. These conflicts between GATT’s adherence to the old protrade bias and pro-regulation pressure from the environment provided
GATT with a perfect moment of identity crisis.
GATT’s efforts to fix this bias and achieve a more mature identity
gathered critical momentum in the launch of the WTO. The WTO’s
mission statement, contained in the preamble of its charter, spotlights
“sustainable development.” It has become obvious that due consideration
and investment for nontrade values, such as the environment and human
health, should be made within the WTO to achieve any development that is
sustainable.
One can understand the creation of the Trade and
Environment Committee, as well as special side agreements like the
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) and the Agreement on
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS), as the WTO’s effort to grow
out of the pro-trade bias and form a more mature and responsive identity.156
The aforementioned identity formation through the GATT era and the
launch of the WTO corresponded with the establishment of the WTO’s
organizational autonomy. Importantly, its autonomy was not simply thrust
upon the WTO with its creation. The seed for autonomy had already been
sown even under the GATT era in its institutional evolution. In its later
days, the GATT began to focus more on the public law aspect of its
member states, such as the stability and predictability of the rule of law.
The GATT slowly evolved into “something greater than a contract” that its
contracting parties would not easily terminate even if its obligations
become too burdensome.157
In the same vein, the once critical notion of nullification or impairment
was weakened because it was assumed away whenever a panel found a

154

Id. ¶ 77.
See, e.g., David P. Fidler, Neither Science Nor Shamans: Globalization of Markets and Health in
the Developing World, 7 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 191, 200–01 (1999) (criticizing the Thai Cigarette
panel’s interpretation of “necessary to protect human health”).
156
See generally SUNGJOON CHO, FREE MARKETS AND SOCIAL REGULATION: A REFORM AGENDA
OF THE GLOBAL TRADING SYSTEM (2003); see also Veijo Heiskanen, The Regulatory Philosophy of
International Trade, 38 J. WORLD TRADE 1 (2004).
157
Debra P. Steger, Afterword: The “Trade and . . .” Conundrum—A Commentary, 96 AM. J. INT’L
L. 135, 137 (2002).
155
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violation.158 In fact, any violation would ipso facto constitute a nullification
or impairment.159 This paradigm shift, from a power-oriented structure
focusing on the outcome of negotiation to a rule-oriented structure valuing
the legal system within GATT, paved the ground for a critical
transformation from a mere contract to an independent organization.160
C. The Failure of Identity Formation
As with human development, the WTO may also encounter a failed
moment of identity formation, such as identity diffusion and foreclosure.
In the former situation, the WTO’s core identity, namely trade, is lost,
while in the latter situation, the WTO becomes irrelevant and unsustainable
due to its pro-trade bias.
Those who advocate a formal or hard linkage between trade and social
values tend to argue that certain “social clauses,” which include fundamental
workers’ rights or minimum international labor standards, should be
normatively incorporated into the WTO system.161 Under this position, rich
WTO members may restrict imports from other poorer members if the
latter’s social conditions or practices violate these social standards. Despite
their ostensible moralistic streaks, these debates on hard linkage are in fact
testimonial to the WTO’s identity crisis. The WTO is continuously receiving
demands for these regulatory roles and is thus exposed to different role
identifications—with labor or environmental organizations—beyond its base
trade organization identity. Perhaps the WTO might be a victim of its own
success. The unprecedented success of the WTO, particularly in regards to
its dispute settlement mechanism, tends to make many social issues gravitate
towards this trade organization.162 This gravitational force presses the WTO

158
Understanding Regarding Notification, Consultation, Dispute Settlement and Surveillance, L/4907
(Nov. 28, 1979), GATT B.I.S.D. (26th Supp.) at 210 (1980).
159
See Panel Report, United States-Taxes on Petroleum and Certain Imported Substances, L/6175
(June 5, 1987) (adopted June 17, 1987), GATT B.I.S.D. (34th Supp.) at 136, §§ 5.1.3–5.1.12 (1988).
160
See JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 109–11 (2d ed. 1997); see also Anne O.
Krueger, Introduction, in THE WTO AS AN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 2 (1998). But see Lisa L.
Martin & Judith Goldstein, Legalization, Trade Liberalization and Domestic Politics: A Cautionary
Note, 54 INT’L ORG. 603 (2000).
161
See, e.g., Virginia A. Leary, Workers’ Rights and International Trade: The Social Clause
(GATT, ILO, NAFTA, U.S. Laws), in 2 FAIR TRADE AND HARMONIZATION 177, 223 (Jagdish Bhagwati
& Robert E. Hudec eds., 1996); Dani Rodrik, Developing Countries After the Uruguay Round (Ctr. for
Econ. Pol’y Res., Working Paper No. 1084, 1994) (proposing a “social safeguards” clause based on
core labor rights in the WTO).
162
See Steve Charnovitz, Triangulating the World Trade Organization, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 28, 30
(2002); Sylvia Ostry, The WTO and International Governance, in THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION
MILLENNIUM ROUND: FREER TRADE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 285, 290, 293 (Klaus Günter
Deutsch & Bernhard Speyer eds., 2001); José E. Alvarez, How Not To Link: Institutional Conundrums
of an Expanded Trade Regime, 7 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 1, 15 (2001).
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to agonize over diverse role expectations.163
Critically, however, such hard linkage risks undermining one of the
WTO’s core values—free trade.164 If the WTO authorizes members to
freely restrict imports from other members that allegedly violate those
social standards, the WTO’s old identity as a trade organization would be
severely undermined since it would fail to uphold trade values. As
discussed above,165 this symptom accounts for identity diffusion.
In general, social standards are lower for developing countries than
developed countries because the former countries are poorer than the
latter.166 Without addressing this inherent developmental disparity, merely
exerting sanctions on poor countries would never achieve a satisfactory
level of protection for putative societal concerns. Contrarily, such
ventures—hard linkage—will only encroach on poor countries’
comparative advantages, such as cheap labor, and thus generate serious
tensions between rich and poor countries without affecting the root cause of
the problem.167 Rich countries may even be tempted to use these regulatory
concerns as convenient excuses for raising trade barriers, as seen in green
or blue protectionism.168 Then, the WTO will perform neither a trade nor a
nontrade function, and its identity would therefore be lost.
This risk of identity diffusion might also be found in yet another
linkage of “trade and development.” During its first decade, the WTO
failed to narrow the income gap between the rich and the poor. The leastdeveloped countries’ marginalization from the mainstream global trading
system and the subsequent abject poverty in these countries seriously
questioned the rationale of the WTO.169 This development deficiency170
drove the WTO toward yet another identification as it launched the Doha
Development Agenda (DDA) in 2001. Yet the rhetoric of a development

163
Tomer Broude analyzed this problem in the area of trade and development. See Tomer Broude,
The Rule(s) of Trade and Rhetos of Development: Reflections on the Functional and Aspirational
Legitimacy of the WTO, 45 COLUM. J. TRANS. L. 221 (2006).
164
See Kym Anderson, Environmental and Labor Standards: What Role for the WTO?, in THE
WTO AS AN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 243–45 (Anne O. Krueger ed., 1998).
165
See supra Parts III.A.3, III.C.3.
166
Anderson, supra note 164, at 244.
167
Id.
168
See Reginald Dale, No ‘Blue-Green’ Protectionism, Please, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 1994,
http://www.nytimes.com/1994/03/29/business/worldbusiness/29iht-think_5.html; cf. Gregory Shaffer,
WTO Blue-Green Blues: The Impact of U.S. Domestic Politics on Trade-Labor, Trade-Environment
Linkages for the WTO’s Future, 24 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 608, 647–48 (2000) (critically observing that
in the absence of financial assistance to poor countries any radical linkage of labor or environment to
trade would be futile).
169
See generally Sungjoon Cho, The WTO’s Gemeinschaft, 56 ALA. L. REV. 483 (2004).
170
Celso L. N. Amorim, The WTO from the Perspective of a Developing Country, 24 FORDHAM
INT’L L.J. 95, 96–99 (2000) (discussing “development deficit” under the WTO in the areas of
agriculture and textiles).
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round might not fully match the technology or capacity of the WTO.171
Nonetheless, if the WTO attempts to achieve development goals by
affording developing countries rule exemptions in the name of “special and
differential treatment,” it might be counterproductive, because it would
eventually hurt development by hindering developing countries’ effort to
get access to the world market.172
In confronting the risk of identity diffusion, some might argue that the
WTO should never be involved in these nontrade regulatory issues, and
should instead focus on traditionally narrow trade issues. 173 But this
impulsive reaction tends to usher in yet another risk of failed identity
formation—foreclosure. In other words, the WTO may be preoccupied by its
own “ritualized behavior,” such as its pro-trade bias, which is completely
unresponsive and unaccountable to larger social environment. 174 This
insulation from its environment and refusal to process the meaningful
information provided by its environment tend to undermine its legitimacy,
and is thus detrimental to the organization’s survival.175
D. Towards a Balanced Identity of the WTO
As is the case of a human individual, the WTO’s identity formation or
identity achievement is inseparable from its recognition of its inevitable
connectedness to its environment. The WTO is an open, not a selfcontained, system.176 The WTO interacts with, responds to, and is even
influenced by its environment. Importantly, however, the WTO’s openness
171

Broude, supra note 163. But see Asif H. Qureshi, International Trade for Development: The
WTO as a Development Institution?, 43 J. WORLD TRADE, 173, 187 (2009) (arguing that “the WTO has
a function as a development institution”).
172
J. Michael Finger & L. Alan Winters, What Can the WTO Do for Developing Countries?, in THE
WTO AS AN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 365, 390 (Anne O. Krueger ed. 1998).
173
Anderson, supra note 164, at 245.
174
Barnett & Finnemore, supra note 29, at 718; see Robert Howse, From Politics to Technocracy—
and Back Again: The Fate of the Multilateral Trading System, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 94 (2002) (criticizing
the “insider network” under the GATT/WTO system); Joseph H. H. Weiler, The Rule of Lawyers and
the Ethos of Diplomats: Reflections on the Internal and External Legitimacy of Dispute Settlement, in
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multilateral trading system); Pascal Lamy, The Place of the WTO and Its Law in the International Legal
Order, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 969 (2006) (contending that “the effectiveness and legitimacy of the WTO
depend on how it relates to norms of other legal systems and on the nature and quality of its
relationships with other international organizations”).
175
Barnett & Finnemore, supra note 29, at 722; cf. Peter M. Gerhart, The Two Constitutional
Visions of the World Trade Organization, 24 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 1, 2 (2003) (critically observing
that the “inward-looking, economic” vision of the WTO could not gain broad support and thus should be
replaced by the “external, participatory” vision aligned with pluralistic, democratic decision-making).
176
See Lamy, supra note 174, at 969 (observing that “the WTO is well aware of the existence of
other systems of norms and of the fact that it is not acting alone in the international sphere”).

389

CHO_FINAL_WORD.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business

10/3/14 7:22 PM

34:359 (2014)

does not deprive itself of an “autopoietic” nature as an organization that
preserves its operative integrity.177 The status quo of the WTO in terms of
its capacity (technology) and resources, which are the very product of its
institutional development, stipulates its central identity as a trade
organization. As of now, the WTO cannot, and should not, become a
human rights organization or an environmental organization. The WTO
may accommodate these nontrade values in various ways by voluntarily
adjusting its own internal legal and institutional choices in the course of its
evolution.178 Yet these nontrade values must not be imposed on the WTO
externally, as they force the WTO to accept norms and consequences
inconsistent with its current identity.179
Therefore, a desirable form of identity formation for the WTO will be
to attain an institutional balance between trade and nontrade, or social,
regulatory values without losing its character as a trade organization. This
balance means reconciliation between trade and social values from the
WTO’s perspective as a trade organization. This reconciliation should be
based on the WTO’s institutional capacity, its core technology, and its own
path dependency. In symbolic rhetoric, the agenda should be “trade and
labor or environment” not “labor or environment and trade.” The WTO’s
core technology, such as its software (jurisprudence) and hardware
(committees), is capable of performing such reconciliation.
Via its constructive (teleological) interpretation, the WTO tribunal
can harmonize trade and social values without losing the WTO’s main
character. In paradigmatic cases such as Gasoline (1996)180 and ShrimpTurtle (1998),181 the WTO tribunal bestowed on domestic regulators broad
discretion in establishing the content of domestic regulations, while it
focused only on the manner in which they were applied.182 Under this case
law, WTO members can freely pursue their non-trade or social policy
objectives as long as they adhere to certain basic procedural disciplines,
such as good faith and due process. This hermeneutics is teleological in the
sense that it was driven by the WTO’s new telos, “sustainable
development,” which is nothing but the WTO’s new commitment to a more
balanced organizational identity than the old GATT.
Therefore, these rulings represent a mature departure from GATT’s
narrow identification with a pro-trade bias, which, if left unchecked, would
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Richard Nobles & David Schiff, Introduction to NIKLAS LUHMANN, LAW AS A SOCIAL SYSTEM
8 (Fatima Kastner et al. eds., 2004).
178
Id.
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See generally Sungjoon Cho, WTO’s Identity Crisis, 5 WORLD TRADE REV. 298 (2006).
180
Appellate Body Report, United States—Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline,
WT/DS2/AB/R (Apr. 29, 1996).
181
Appellate Body Report, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp
Products, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998) [hereinafter Shrimp-Turtle].
182
Id. ¶¶ 146–86 (regarding the so-called “chapeau test”); see also CHO, supra note 156, at 45–62.
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have led to foreclosure as a failure of identity formation. In these cases, the
WTO no longer dismissed social values in a blind pursuit of trade values,
as it did in Thai Cigarette. For example, in Shrimp-Turtle, the WTO
tribunal referred to non-trade, environmental conventions, such as the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna
and Flora (CITES), in a serious effort to locate common ground between
the WTO and those environmental treaties.183
Another way of embracing social values within the WTO without
diffusing its identity is to pursue quasi-harmonization through international
regulatory standards. Any hard regulatory bargaining within the WTO that
aims for a single undertaking would be infeasible simply due to the WTO’s
lack of core technology in these regulatory areas, as well as the politically
combustible nature of those target regulations.184 A more realistic way is to
utilize the WTO’s pre-existing hardware, such as the Trade and
Environment Committee and the SPS Committee, to encourage WTO
members to tap into relevant international regulatory standards.185 These
committees, if well operated, can contribute greatly to regulatory dialogue
among WTO members and effectively address the subtle interface between
trade and regulatory issues. At the same time, in these committee activities
the WTO can co-opt relevant international regulatory organizations, such as
the International Organization for Standardization (ISO), the International
Electrotechnical Commission (IEC), and the Codex Alimentarius Commission.
Finally, this reconciliation may also be manifested as coherence in
policy making between the WTO and other relevant IOs. For example, the
World Bank can help the WTO finance technical assistance projects, such
as the training of government officials, to build the regulatory capacity of
developing countries.186 The WTO and other IOs can also perform a joint
study that identifies areas of common concerns and interests. The recent
WTO-ILO joint study, “Trade and Employment: Challenges for Policy
Research,” offers a good example in this regard.187 By identifying common
interests and concerns of both organizations, as well as defining a
relationship between trade and employment, this type of joint study
provides a fertile ground for policy coherence between trade and non-trade
values. Under this nuanced approach, the WTO can maintain fidelity to its
identity as a trade organization while still responding to its increasingly
demanding environment.
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Shrimp-Turtle, supra note 181, ¶¶ 130, 132.
But see Andrew T. Guzman, Global Governance and the WTO, 45 HARV. INT’L L.J. 303, 307–
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See Cho, supra note 151.
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E. Summary
This part applies the theory of an IO’s identity formation developed in
the previous part to the WTO. In the early days, the GATT identified with
its founding nations that were preoccupied with the elimination of trade
barriers, mostly tariffs. Its organizational autonomy was nearly nonexistent
as the GATT was a mere tool for those founding nations to achieve a
functional need⎯trade liberalization.
However, as the regulatory environment changed, GATT’s pro-trade
identity was under attack and it was forced to rethink its original identity.
GATT, and subsequently the WTO, underwent this identity crisis as it
came to terms with its environment, in particular the regulatory world.
From a normative perspective, the WTO’s ideal manifestation of its
identity formation is an ongoing process. It should continuously maintain a
balanced identity between trade and non-trade values in its diurnal
operation.
Many avenues within the WTO system, ranging from
adjudication to peer review, can help attain this normative goal.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article argues that an IO, like a human being, is prone to the
process of identity formation in establishing its autonomy from its member
states. As an IO undergoes various institutional changes, its old
identification with an original goal may encounter a new identification with
another purpose, and thus it may experience confusion regarding its true
identity (identity crisis). But an IO can achieve a coherent institutional self
by striking a balance between these multiple identifications under the
constraints that various parameters, such as its environment and its
technology, impose. Yet an IO may also fail to achieve its identity by
insulating itself from its environment (foreclosure) or being adrift in the
middle of these multiple identifications without making any commitment to
a final identity (identity diffusion).
This identity theory of IOs may find in the WTO its major empirical
confirmation. As an organic institution that incessantly interacts with its
environment, the WTO has evolved from the early GATT, which was
defined largely by a pro-trade character, to the WTO, whose identity
formation has been influenced by a strong external demand for a new
identification with nontrade (societal) values, such as protection of the
environment and human health. From a normative perspective, the WTO’s
identity formation is to strike an institutional balance between traditional
trade values and these nontrade values. It is an ongoing process that
reveals itself in the WTO’s daily operation—adjudication or peer review.
Finally, this Article addresses the external or macro social dynamics
of an autonomous entity itself. It explores how a self-organizing entity
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forms its organizational identity by incessantly interacting with its
environment. It also anthropomorphizes such an entity by analogizing its
organizational development to that of a human. Yet, this Article leaves the
social dynamics within an organization largely unexplained. Other
scholars may explore how individual members of an organization, such as a
state or a company, form a collective identity among them. They may
focus on internal, micro dynamics among individual actors leading
eventually to the formation of a corporate identity.188

188

See International State, supra note 71.
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